Why Nigeria Matters to U.S. National Security

When U.S. policymakers discuss national security priorities, Africa rarely appears in the first three sentences. Yet beneath the headlines about China and Russia lies a simpler truth: if the United States wants resilient supply chains, stable energy markets, and effective security partnerships, Nigeria is not optional. It is central.

The recent approval of the U.S.-Nigeria Joint Working Group signals Washington’s recognition of this reality. Led by Nigeria’s National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu, this framework commits both countries to enhanced intelligence sharing, expedited defense equipment processing, and coordinated counterterrorism operations. The timing matters. Nigeria faces sustained security threats from Boko Haram, ISWAP, and criminal networks across multiple regions, while the United States confronts the challenge of building partnerships that can actually deliver results rather than simply absorb aid budgets.

But security cooperation alone misses the broader strategic picture. Nigeria’s value to U.S. national security rests on three concrete pillars: critical minerals, maritime security, and institutional capacity. Each represents an area where Nigerian success or failure directly affects American interests, and where focused engagement can produce measurable outcomes.

Start with critical minerals. Nigeria holds substantial reserves of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements that are essential for electric vehicle batteries, renewable energy storage, and defense systems. Since September 2023, Chinese companies have invested over $1.3 billion in Nigerian lithium processing facilities, with additional plants scheduled to open by late 2025. These are not speculative ventures. They represent working processing capacity producing battery-grade lithium concentrate for export markets.

The United States has a choice here. It can watch China lock in processing relationships that give Beijing leverage over global supply chains, or it can engage directly through the Development Finance Corporation and EXIM Bank to support alternative processing partnerships. The issue is not whether Nigeria develops its lithium sector. Chinese capital ensures it will. The question is whether the United States shapes the governance standards, labor protections, and export relationships that determine who benefits from this development and under what terms.

Nigeria’s approach to mineral processing carries wider implications. The country now requires local processing of minerals before export, aiming to capture value beyond raw ore sales. This policy aligns with U.S. interests in building midstream capacity outside adversarial control. If Nigeria succeeds in establishing transparent, well-governed processing operations that can compete globally, it demonstrates a pathway other African nations can follow. If Nigeria’s processing sector becomes dominated by opaque contracts and predatory terms, it validates critics who argue that African mineral wealth inevitably benefits foreign powers rather than local populations.

Maritime security presents the second pillar. The Gulf of Guinea accounts for significant global oil shipments and regional trade. For years, piracy made these waters among the most dangerous globally, threatening shipping, raising insurance costs, and constraining economic activity. Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, launched in 2021, changed this calculation. The initiative combined air assets, patrol vessels, intelligence coordination, and specialized personnel to create integrated maritime domain awareness. The results are measurable: Nigerian territorial waters have recorded zero piracy incidents for over three consecutive years.

The International Maritime Organization Secretary-General recently described Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project as a model for regional cooperation, praising the zero-piracy record and calling for sustained investment. This success matters for U.S. interests because maritime security is not an abstract good. It affects insurance premiums for American companies operating in the region, deployment patterns for U.S. naval assets, and the viability of energy projects that contribute to global supply diversity.

However, maritime security gains remain fragile without sustained funding and maintenance. Nigeria’s challenge now is ensuring the Deep Blue infrastructure receives continuous operational support rather than declining into equipment deterioration and personnel turnover. U.S. security assistance that supports maintenance contracts, spare parts procurement, and training pipeline sustainability will determine whether the current success becomes a temporary spike or a permanent shift in regional maritime conditions.

The third pillar is institutional capacity, particularly in areas where security and economic activity intersect. As Nigeria develops critical minerals processing, expands maritime operations, and coordinates counterterrorism efforts, it needs functioning systems for managing sensitive technology, protecting intellectual property, and preventing insider threats. These are not peripheral concerns. They determine whether partnerships with U.S. companies and agencies can proceed or whether risk assessments force American entities to limit engagement.

Nigeria’s participation in the U.S.-Nigeria Joint Working Group creates opportunities to institutionalize practices that reduce these risks. Enhanced intelligence sharing requires secure communications infrastructure. Defense equipment transfers require maintenance protocols and parts supply chains. Counterterrorism coordination requires interagency processes that prevent information leakage. Each of these elements demands institutional investments that serve Nigerian sovereignty interests while enabling deeper partnership.

The analytical point here is that Nigeria’s strategic value does not rest on abstract potential or aspirational rhetoric. It rests on concrete, measurable capacities: processing plants that turn ore into battery-grade inputs, patrol vessels that suppress piracy, and institutions that can manage sensitive partnerships without catastrophic breaches. Where these capacities exist, partnership becomes viable. Where they do not, engagement remains superficial regardless of diplomatic statements.

For U.S. policymakers, this creates clear decision points. The Development Finance Corporation can either prioritize Nigerian mineral processing projects that establish transparent governance standards, or it can watch Chinese state-backed capital dominate the sector under terms that maximize Beijing’s leverage. The U.S. Navy can either support sustainable maritime security through maintenance assistance and intelligence sharing, or it can rely on episodic deployments that address symptoms without building partner capacity. U.S. agencies can either invest in institutional strengthening that makes Nigerian counterparts reliable partners, or they can limit engagement and accept the constraints that fragile institutions impose.

Nigeria’s government faces parallel choices. It can sustain the Deep Blue Project through consistent budgeting and resist pressures to divert maritime security resources to other priorities. It can enforce transparent contracting in the minerals sector and resist opaque deals that generate short-term revenue while mortgaging long-term governance. It can build institutional capacity for managing sensitive partnerships even when bureaucratic inertia and political pressures favor the status quo.

These are not simple choices. They require sustained political commitment, resource allocation, and willingness to prioritize long-term capacity over immediate returns. But they are choices that will determine whether the U.S.-Nigeria security relationship becomes substantive or remains primarily symbolic. The Joint Working Group framework provides structure. Whether it produces results depends on whether both governments follow through with the investments and institutional reforms that convert framework into functioning partnership.

For U.S. national security strategy, the question is straightforward. Does Washington treat Nigeria as a pivot state whose stability and capacity affect broader regional outcomes, or as one more country on a long list of partnerships that receive attention only during crises? The evidence suggests Nigeria belongs in the first category. Its population, economy, security challenges, and resource endowments all position it as a state whose trajectory shapes West African stability. The United States can engage seriously and help build the capacities that serve both Nigerian and American interests, or it can remain distant and watch other powers shape Nigeria’s future. What it cannot do is pretend that Nigeria’s choices do not affect American security interests. They do, and increasingly so.